We consider rationing problems where the claims are state contingent, i.e., each individual submits a claim for every state in the …rst stage and the realization of the state happens in the second stage. A rule must distribute the resources in the …rst stage before the realization of the state of the world. We introduce two natural extensions of proportional rules in this framework, namely, the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule, and characterize them using axioms standard in the literature.
Introduction
The rationing problem is arguably the simplest model of distributive justice. The problem involves a resource that is to be divided among individuals each of whom submit a claim for the resource. Rationing is required when the sum of the claims exceeds the resource, with typical examples being bankruptcy, taxation, inheritance, etc. The problem of rationing is as old as the history of civilization itself. We can …nd examples of such problems in ancient texts such as the Talmud and Aristotle. The …rst formal analysis of the rationing problem was presented by O'Neill (1982) where he interprets the resource as inheritance. The problem of rationing is an ethical or normative issue since neither the market nor traditional institutions can provide a convincing solution. For this reason, adopting an axiomatic approach has been the focus of the literature on rationing. Probably the most natural rule in this context arises from Aristotle's maxim, "Equals should be treated equally, and unequals unequally, in proportion to relevant similarities and di¤erences"from Nicomachean Ethics. The Proportional rule gives shares in proportion to claims. There are various normative treatments of the Proportional rule, such as O'Neill (1982), Moulin (1987) , Chun (1988) , Young (1988) , and Ju et al. (2007) , etc.
Other rules central to the literature are based on normative axioms, including various forms of egalitarianism. The Uniform Gains rule equalizes the shares such as the shares do not exceed the claims. The Uniform Losses rule equalizes the losses (di¤erence between claim and share) to the extent that it is possible. One can refer to some axiomatic characterizations of egalitarian rules for di¤erent environments in Dagan (1996) , Herrero and Villar (2001) , Sprumont (1991) , Kesten (2006) , Juarez and Kumar (2013) , etc. Young (1987a) characterizes a class of parametric rules in the taxation problem and Young (1987b) introduces another important family of rules called the Equal Sacri…ce rules. Rules from ancient texts and their extensions have also been considered by various authors. Aumann and Maschler (1985) provides a rule from the Talmud in the bankruptcy context and papers like, Hokari and Thomson (2003) study generalizations of the same. Alcalde, Marco, and Silva (2005) extends an old solution for bankruptcy problems described by Ibn Ezra in the 12 th century. Surveys of rationing problems are provided by Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003 Thomson ( , 2013 where interesting characterizations of rationing rules are mentioned.
We consider the rationing problem in a two stage setting where the claims are state contingent. In the …rst stage, each individual submits a claim for every possible state of the world. The realization of the state happens in the second stage. A rule must distribute the resources in the …rst stage, i.e., before the realization of the state of the world. Such a situation may arise, for instance, in the allocation of …scal budget of a country. Di¤erent departments of a government may require di¤erent resources in di¤erent states of the world to be realized in the coming …scal year. For example, the Department of Defense may have di¤erent requirements depending on its relations with neighboring countries in the following year. The Department of Agriculture has requirements based on factors like rainfall next year. The Department of Health may have requirements that depend on factors like the incidence of epidemic and the weather. However, the federal budget must be allocated at the beginning of the …scal year. Another example of our setting is the distribution of research funds (or travel grants) among graduate students of a department in a university who expect travel or research expenses contingent on the state of the world (e.g., expenses based on the results of their research, travels based on the conferences accepting their paper, etc.). A situation like our setting also arises in the allocation of university funds among di¤erent departments based on their performance, or need, or NSF funds to researchers from various universities, etc.
This natural framework of two-stage, state-contingent rationing problem has not been given much consideration in the literature. A fairly close setting called multi-issue allocations (MIA), introduced in Calleja et al. (2005) , has been studied. In MIA, the claim of each individual is a vector that speci…es the amount claimed on each issue and a rule distributes shares for each issue and for each individual. Bergantiños The MIA framework however does not consider uncertainty. A similar framework to ours that does consider uncertainty has been analyzed by Habis and Herings (2013) . They focus on the stability 1 of the stochastic extensions of various rationing rules and show that the only stable rule is the stochastic extension of the Uniform Gains rule. Xue (2015) studies the Egalitarian rule for the pre-committed division of a perfectly divisible commodity where the claims are uncertain. Chun and Thomson (1990a and 1990b ) study the bargaining problem with uncertain disagreement points. Although the bargaining problem and the rationing framework are similar, they di¤er in the following sense. Bargaining theory deals with feasible sets that are arbitrarily convex and compact sets as opposed to being the comprehensive hull of subsets of a hyperplane normal to a vector of ones.
In our two-stage framework where the individuals submit their claims in the …rst stage and uncertainty is resolved in the second stage, the resource must be allocated in the …rst stage. Two particularly natural approaches arise in such situations. The …rst approach is to apply a rationing rule on the expectation of the claims, which we call the ex-ante rationing rule. In the second approach, we …rst use a rationing rule to …nd the shares of every individual for each state based on the claim pro…le in that state. Then the …nal shares are calculated by taking expectation of the shares over states. We call this rule the ex-post rationing rule. In this paper, we will focus our attention to proportional rules and characterize both the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule. Our axiomatic characterizations are based on the No Advantageous Reallocation axiom introduced by Moulin (1985) . This axiom states that no group of individuals can bene…t from reallocating their claims amongst themselves. We extend this concept to our state contingent framework by introducing two nonmanipulability conditions. The …rst extension which we call No Advantageous Reallocation across Individuals (NARAI ) requires that no group of individuals bene…ts if transfers are allowed within a state. The next extension considers transfers across states which we call No Advantageous Reallocation across States (NARAS ). We also use the axioms of Anonymity (AN ), Symmetry (SYM ), Continuity (CONT ), No Award for Null (NAN ), and Independence (IND). The AN axiom says that the rule should not distinguish based on the names of the individuals. The SYM axiom requires that the names of the states do not matter. The CONT axiom states that the rule should be a continuous function in its arguments. The NAN axiom says that individuals with zero claims in all states should be allocated zero amount. The IND axiom says that if we mix two lotteries 2 with a third one, then the rationing rule associated with these two mixed lotteries does not depend on the third lottery used. We show that the ex-ante proportional rule is the only rule satisfying NARAI, CONT, NAN, and NARAS whereas the ex-post proportional rule is characterized by NARAI, CONT, NAN, SYM, and IND.
Another important aspect of this problem is to compare the shares allocated by the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule. We compare shares given by the ex-ante and ex-post proportional rules for various distributions of claims and …nd su¢ cient conditions under which a particular individual will be favoured by one rule compared to the other. Furthermore we show that an individual with a deterministic claim always prefers the ex-post proportional rule over the ex-ante proportional rule.
In Section 2, we introduce the preliminaries. Section 3 presents the comparison between the ex-ante and the ex-post proportional rules. In Section 4, we provide our characterization results, and Section 5 concludes with some directions for future research.
Preliminaries
In the state-contingent claims' framework, a rationing problem is de…ned as (N; S; x; p; t) where N is a …nite set of individuals and S is a …nite set of the states of the world. 3 The state contingent claim matrix x 2 R N S + represents the claims of individuals in various states, where x is denotes the claim of individual i in state s. The probabilities of states is denoted by p 2 jSj 1 and t 0 is the resource to be shared among the individuals. 4 It is assumed that P i2N
x is t for all s 2 S. Throughout the paper, we consider a …xed population N and a …xed set S of states. For the sake of brevity, we denote our problem (x; p; t). A non-empty set of problems is called a domain and is denoted by D. 5 A rationing rule ' : D ! R N + gives a vector of shares such that
Our main characterization results are obtained for rich domains which we de…ne as follows: 3 The standard rationing problem is de…ned as (N;
x i t and t 0 is the resource to be shared among the agents. A rationing rule ' assigns a vector of shares '(N; x; t) 2 R N + to every rationing problem such that P i2N ' i (N; x; t) = t.
4 jSj 1 denotes a jSj 1 dimensional simplex. 5 More precisely this is a restricted domain of problems where N and S are …xed so a better notation would be D(N; S): However, for notational simplicity we use D since it does not raise any confusion.
Now we will de…ne two rationing rules which involve the proportionality idea. Because our rules are based on proportionality idea, let us recall the standard proportional rule when there is only one (certain) state of the world s, i.e., S = fsg.
The proportional rule ( pr) is de…ned as
The ex-ante proportional rule ( pr) is de…ned by applying the proportional rule to the expectation of the state contingent claims.
The ex-post proportional rule ( e pr) is de…ned by expectation of the shares found by applying the proportional rule on the state contingent claims.
The illustration of the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule for a simple economy with two people and two states is presented in Figure  1 .
As shown in Figure 1 , the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule do not necessarily coincide. Therefore it would be interesting to know the conditions under which the shares according to two rules di¤er. For example, we would like to investigate which individuals prefer one rule over another. In the next section we will provide various comparisons between these two rules. 
Comparisons
As we just witnessed, the shares allocated by the two rules can be di¤erent. These rules coincide only in special cases of state probabilities and claim vectors.
In the following proposition we provide a general expression for the di¤erence in shares by the two rules.
Proposition 1 Let (x; p; t) 2 D be given. Further assume that x 2 R N S ++ . The di¤ erence between the shares of an individual i 2 N given by the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule is the following
Proof. De…ne js = xjs xis for all j 2 N and for all s 2 S. So the ex-ante proportional rule for individual i is given by So the di¤ erence between the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule is
We use this expression for two-state and two-individual scenario in the following example to illustrate the conditions on claim vectors such that these two rules coincide.
Example 1 For jN j = jSj = 2 and p 1 = p 2 = 1 2 we have
For jN j = 2, both rules give identical shares when the sum of the claims is equal for each state (Figure 2 ) or the ratio of the claims for each state is equal ( Figure  3 ). The next proposition will illustrate that if an individual has a deterministic claim, then he would prefer the ex-post proportional rule over the ex-ante proportional rule. Conversely, the ex-ante proportional rule protects an individual whose claim distribution has a higher spread.
Proposition 2 For all (x; p; t) 2 D and for all i 2 N , If x is = c 0 for all s 2 S, then e pr i (x; p; t) pr i (x; p; t)
Characterizations
In this section we introduce some axioms and we use them to characterize the rules we have discussed above.
Continuity (CONT): For all (x; p; t) 2 D and for all sequences (
Continuity tells us that small changes in the parameters of the problem do not bring big jumps in the shares. Continuity is desirable because we do not want small errors (e.g., measurement errors) to lead to big changes in the shares.
Anonymity (AN): For all (x; p; t) 2 D, for all permutations : N ! N; and for all i 2 N , ' i (x; p; t) = ' (i) (x ; p; t); where x = (x (1) ; x (2) ; :::x (jN j) ):
Anonymity says that the names of the individuals do not matter. This is a very natural axiom and is central to the literature on fairness.
Symmetry (SYM): For all (x; p; t) 2 D, for all permutations : S ! S; and for all i 2 N , ' i (x; p; t) = ' i (x ; p ; t); where p = (p (1) ; p (2) ; :::; p (jSj) ) and x = (x (1) ; x (2) ; :::; x (jSj) ):
Symmetry is similar to the Anonymity Axiom with the role of individuals being substituted by states. It says that the names of the states do not matter.
No Award for Null Players (NAN): For all (x; p; t) 2 D and for all i 2 N , if x is = 0 for all s 2 S, then ' i (x; p; t) = 0.
No Award for Null Players Axiom says that an individual with zero claim for each state should get zero share. This axiom is also called the Dummy axiom or Null axiom in the literature. Moulin (1985) de…ned No Advantageous Reallocation axiom to characterize the egalitarian and utilitarian solutions in quasi-linear social choice problems. We will de…ne two axioms on invariance to reallocation in a similar manner where transfers are made either across individuals or across states. 
(p s x 0 is ) and x js = x 0 js for all j 2 N nfig and for all s 2 S, then ' j (x; p; t) = ' j (x 0 ; p; t) for all j 2 N nfig.
NARAS implies that if individual i reallocates his claim across all the states provided that his expected claim remains constant then other individuals'share (hence his own share) will not change. This axiom becomes compelling when we want the shares of individuals to be invariant to the distribution of the claims. Moreover, NARAS has a ‡avor of the standard non-bossy axiom which requires the shares of all the other agents to remain unchanged if an agent unilaterally changes his report in a way that does not a¤ect his own share. 7 For the remainder of the paper we will consider rich domains, D. Before we characterize our two rules, namely the ex-post proportional rule and the ex-ante proportional rule, we characterize a general class of rules that satisfy NARAI, Anonymity, and Continuity. This class of rules includes both the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule. Moreover, this class includes rules like equal split, and non-symmetric proportional rules among others. R + ! R for all s 2 S such that for all i 2 N we have
Proof. The "if" part of the statement is obvious. We will prove the "only if" part. Let (x; p; t) 2 D: Let ' be a rationing rule satisfying NARAI, CONT, and AN. Let x 0 = (x 1 + x 2 ; 0; x 3 ; :::). Applying NARAI for every individual belonging to N nf1; 2g, we get P i2N nf1;2g
' i (x 0 ; p; t). Therefore
Let x 00 = (x 1 ; x N nf1g ; 0; 0; :::). Now we apply NARAI for individual 1. So ' 1 (x; p; t) = ' 1 (x 00 ; p; t). This implies
By (3) Thus we get
As it is evident from (5), f is additive in the …rst term and by de…nition f is continuous (since ' is continuous). So by invoking Cor 3.1.9, p.51, from Eichhorn (1978) , we deduce that f is linear in the …rst term, that is, there exists a continuous function W :
[(W s (x N ; p; t)x is )] + g(x N ; p; t):
jN j . Hence we get the desired functional form.
Remark 1 Our axioms NARAI, CONT, and AN are independent. To show the independence of the axioms we provide following examples:
This ex-ante uniform gains rule satis…es all the axioms except NARAI. The family of rules characterized in the theorem above contains various rules including proportional and egalitarian rules. In the example below, we provide some notable rules that belong to this family. When the weight functions are uniform with respect to states, that is,
x N s for all s, we get ' i (x; p; t) = The family contains non-symmetric proportional rules with respect to states as well, e.g., ' i (x; p; t) = xi1 x N 1 t when W 1 (x N ; p; t) = t x N 1 ; W 2 (x N ; p; t) = W 3 (x N ; p; t) = ::: = 0 (all the weight is given to state 1).
In Theorem 1 we characterized the family of rules which include both the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule. We provide characterization of these rules in Theorems 3 and 4. Before characterizing our two rules, we present a family of generalized proportional rules in Theorem 2 that satis…es NARAI, CONT, and NAN. 
Proof. "If" part is obvious. We will prove the "only if" part. Let (x; p; t) 2 D: Let ' be a rationing rule satisfying NARAI, CONT, and NAN. First we establish that NARAI and NAN imply AN. Since ' satis…es NARAI, we know from Theorem 1 of Ju et al. (2007) that ' i (x; p; t) must be of the form
which ensures that AN is satis…ed. Thus we know that ' satis…es the premises of our Theorem 1. Hence we have
x is x N s jN j W s (x N ; p; t) :
Now we apply NAN to get the desired functional form of ' i (x; p; t). Take i 2 N with x is = 0 for all s 2 S. NAN implies that ' i (x; p; t) = t jN j + P s2S h
x is
Note that the general functional form of ' i must hold for any problem (x; p; t) 2 D including those (x; p; t) 2 D where there exists i 2 N such that x is = 0 for all s 2 S.
Remark 2 For jN j = 2, NARAI is trivially satis…ed. In order to get our characterization, we can use null consistency axiom in a variable population setting similar to Chun (1988) . This axiom states that if an individual i claims zero for each state, then shares of the individuals other than i are invariant of whether individual i is present or not. Notice that this axiom implies NAN. By replacing NAN with Null Consistency one would obtain the desired characterization.
Remark 3 Our axioms NARAI, CONT, and NAN are independent. To show the independence of the axioms we provide following examples:
This ex-ante uniform gains rule satis…es all the axioms except NARAI.
This rule satis…es all the axioms except CONT.
' i (x; p; t) = t jN j for all i 2 N and for all (x; p; t) 2 D. This equal split rule satis…es all the axioms except NAN.
The ex-ante proportional rule allocates the resource to the individuals in proportion to their expected claims. Due to the simplicity of this rule, it becomes very practical and it is appealing in various scenarios. Rather than requiring the planner to have information about the whole distribution of the claims, it suf-…ces for the planner to elicit expected claims. In many cases, it is also impossible for the individuals to know the exact distribution of their claims beforehand. For example, individuals may not know their precise claims for some improbable events. They rather know, say from historical experience, some estimate of their expected claim. In Theorem 3, we characterize the ex-ante proportional rule by using NARAS in addition to the axioms of Theorem 2. Proof. "If"part is obvious. We will prove the "only if"part. Let (x; p; t) 2 D: Let ' be a rationing rule satisfying NARAI, CONT, NAN, and NARAS. Given that ' satis…es the premises of Theorem 2, we have ' i (x; p; t) = P [p s (x is x 0 is )] = 0, for all i 2 N:
By NARAS, we have ' i (x; p; t) = ' i (x 0 ; p; t), for all i 2 N . Then
Fix j 2 N nfig; by (7) we have P s2S
. By the richness of D, we have W s (x N ; p; t) = W s (x 0 N ; p; t), for all s 2 S. By using (7) we get
By (6) and (8) Remark 4 Note that for jSj = 2, mean preserving reallocation is only possible when p 1 = p 2 which makes NARAS ine¤ ective to obtain h s = h s 0 for all s 0 6 = s. One can add SYM to obtain the desired characterization.
Before characterizing the ex-post proportional rule let us note that NARAS axiom is not satis…ed by the ex-post proportional rule. Figure 4 below illustrates an instance of this fact with a two-individual and two-state example where both states are equally likely. Here, individual 2 has a deterministic claim, i.e., he claims c 2 in both states. Now, if individual 1 also has a deterministic claim of, say c 1 , in both states then the …nal allocation by the ex-post proportional rule is given by pr(E(x)). In contrast, suppose individual 1 reallocates his claims across the two states (as x 11 and x 12 ) in such a way that the mean of the claims is preserved at c 1 . In this case, the …nal allocation by the ex-post proportional rule is given by E(pr(x)). Clearly, individual 1 is worse o¤ by this mean-preserving spread and thus NARAS is not satis…ed. Next remark illustrates that the rest of the axioms in our theorem are independent as well.
Remark 5 Our axioms NARAI, CONT, NAN, and NARAS are independent.
To show the independence of the axioms we provide following examples:
This ex-ante uniform gains rule satis…es all the axioms except NARAI. Now we will characterize the ex-post proportional rule. The functional form of ex-post proportional rule is additively separable with respect to the states. This is similar to the expected utility form due to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) . Notice that the lotteries in our framework is analogous to probabilities of the states, (p s ) s2S and the outcomes are given by (x s ; t) s2S where x s = (x 1s ; x 2s ; :::; x jN js ). Moreover the preference of agent i over lottery p 2 jSj 1 is de…ned by the ordering given by the rule ' i (x; p; t). Therefore in the spirit of Expected Utility Theory, we will utilize the independence axiom which is de…ned below.
Independence (IND)
: For all (x; p; t); (x; q; t); (x; r; t) 2 D, for all i 2 N , and for all 2 (0; 1), we have ' i (x; p; t) ' i (x; q; t) if and only if ' i (x; p+(1 )r; t) ' i (x; q + (1 )r; t).
IND implies that the ordering of an individual's share with respect to two different state probabilities is preserved if these two state probabilities are mixed with any other state probability.
The ex-post proportional rule is obtained by …rst …nding the shares of an individual for each state of the world using proportional rule on the claim pro…le in that state and then taking expectation of the shares over all the states. Compared to the ex-ante proportional rule which is simple and practical in some settings as we have discussed above, the ex-post proportional rule embodies a deeper sense of proportionality. This is true because the shares are found by applying proportional rule for each possible state of the world. The ex-post proportional rule stands out as a more prominent rule according to the principle of proportionality. Therefore, there is a strong case for using this rule based on this principle if we are able to compute share of an individual for each possible state of the world. By keeping all the axioms of Theorem 2 and adding SYM and IND we get characterization of the ex-post proportional rule in Theorem 4. Proof. "If" part is obvious. We will prove the "only if" part. Let (x; p; t) 2 D: Let ' be a rationing rule satisfying NARAI, CONT, NAN, SYM, and IND. Given that ' satis…es the premises of Theorem 2, we have
Notice that the number of states is …nite. Moreover, given the way we have de…ned preferences over lotteries, i.e., as the ordering given by ' i (x; p; t), our CONT and IND axioms imply that the preferences are continuous in p and satisfy v.N-M Independence axiom. Therefore we can utilize the Expected Utility Theorem and deduce that ' i is additively separable with respect to probabilities. That is, for all x 2 R N S + for all p 2 jSj 1 , and for all s 2 S there exists
.
By SYM, we have u is = u is 0 for all s; s 0 2 S. Therefore we have
By (9) and (11) we deduce that for all s 2 S there exists v :
Consider a degenerate lottery s , that is, …x s 2 S and let p s = 1. 
Conclusion
We study rationing problems where the claims are state contingent. We introduce two extensions of the proportional rules in our framework -the ex-ante and the ex-post proportional rules. Applying the proportional rule to the expected claim gives the ex-ante proportional rule. The ex-post proportional rule is de…ned as the expectation of the shares given by the proportional rule for various states. To characterize these rules we propose two extensions of No Advantageous Reallocation introduced by Moulin (1985) . The …rst extension, NARAI, requires that no group of individuals bene…ts if transfers are allowed across individuals for each state. The second extension, NARAS, implies that an individual cannot change other individuals'shares (hence his own share) by reallocating his claim across the states while his expected claim is constant. We characterize the ex-ante proportional rule by NARAI and NARAS combined with Continuity, and No Award for Null Players. To characterize the ex-post proportional rule, we borrow Independence axiom from the Expected Utility Theory. This axiom says that by mixing two lotteries with a third one, the rationing rule remains una¤ected by the choice of the third lottery. Replacing NARAS with the Independence Axiom, and adding Symmetry give the characterization of the ex-post proportional rule. We also compare the shares of the two rules by considering the di¤erence in the shares of an individual allocated by the two rules as a function of the claim vector and state probabilities. We have demonstrated the conditions under which the two rules coincide. It is also shown that an individual with deterministic claim will prefer the ex-post proportional rule over the ex-ante proportional rule. This paper leads us to two particularly important issues to be considered for future research. The …rst issue is to …nd axiomatic characterizations of the extensions of other important rules, such as Uniform Gains and Uniform Losses. It will also be interesting to extend our framework to situations, where the resource itself is state contingent, and where the individuals have subjective probabilities.
